This paper develops a computable general equilibrium model in which endogenous agency costs can potentially alter business-cycle dynamics. A principal conclusion is that the agency-cost model replicates the empiricalfact that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons. This hump-shaped output behavior arises because households delay their investment decisions until agency costs are at their lowest-a point in time several periods after the initial shock. (JEL E32, E44) At least since Irving Fisher's (1933) "debt-deflation" explanation of the Great Depression, many economists have viewed financial factors, such as borrower net worth, as important elements of business-cycle fluctuations. The familiar story goes something like this. To engage in investment opportunities, entrepreneurs must partially rely on external finance. This borrowing is typically limited because of the agency costs involved. An aggregate shock that transfers wealth from entrepreneurs to lenders will lower aggregate investment because this wealth redistribution will increase the need for external finance and thus lead to greater agency costs. These shocks can then be propagated forward because the lower level of investment today tends to lead to lower levels of capital, output, and net worth tomorrow.
A related attempt to model long-lived entrepreneurs is provided by Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John H. Moore (1995) . There are two distinct differences between the current paper and theirs. First, the underlying contracting environment in Kiyotaki and Moore is quite different. They build on the work of Oliver Hart and Moore (1994), which analyzes the contracting problem in an environment with ex post renegotiation and the inalienability of human capital. One implication of the Kiyotaki-Moore contract is that borrowing is so tightly constrained by the level of net worth that default never occurs in equilibrium. In contrast, we follow BG and adopt the costly state verification model of Robert M. Townsend (1979) . Here, lending exceeds net worth, so that default is an equilibrium phenomenon. A second difference between this paper and Kiyotaki and Moore is that we attempt to quantify the effects of agency costs in an otherwise standard RBC model. Section I of the paper develops the optimal financial contract in a partial equilibrium setting and demonstrates the aggregation result that is so important in the sequel. Section II lays out the complete general equilibrium environment. Section III discusses calibration, and Sections IV and V present our numerical results. We conclude in Section VI.
L The Financial Contract
In this section we consider the financial contract in a partial equilibrium setting. This financial contract generates an upwardly sloped supply curve for investment goods. In the next section we will embed this supply curve into an otherwise standard RBC model. We are able to separate consideration of the contract from the rest of the general equilibrium model because the contract is only one period in length-it is negotiated at the beginning of a period and resolved by the end of that same period. General equilibrium issues affect the contract through the level of entrepreneurial net worth, n > 0, and through the aggregate price of capital, q > 0. For the purposes of this section, we will take n and q parametrically.
The contract consists of two parties: an entrepreneur with net worth n > 0, and a lender with resources that he may wish to lend to the entrepreneur. Both are assumed to be risk neutral. 3 The entrepreneur has access to a stochastic technology that contemporaneously transforms i consumption goods into wi units of capital. The random variable w is i.i.d. across time and across entrepreneurs, with distribution 4X, density 4, a nonnegative support, and a mean of unity. Agency issues are introduced into the environment by assuming that w is privately observed by the entrepreneur. Others can privately observe w only at a monitoring cost of 4i capital units, i.e., the attempt to monitor the project results in the destruction of 1i units of capital. This informational asymmetry creates a moral hazard problem because, absent monitoring, the entrepreneur may wish to misreport the true value of w. The optimal contract will be structured in such a way that the entrepreneur will always truthfully report the w realization. Note that the capital production and monitoring technologies each exhibit constant returns to scale. This assumed linearity is the source of the aggregation result below.
To make the asymmetric information problem relevant, assume that net worth is sufficiently small so that entrepreneurs would like to receive some external financing from firms. Douglas Gale and Martin Hellwig (1985) and Stephen Williamson (1987a) have demonstrated that in environments of this type, the optimal contract between lenders and entrepreneurs is risky debt.4 The contract will be characterized by an interest rate rk. An entrepreneur who borrows (i -n) consumption goods agrees to repay ( 1 + rk) (i -n) capital goods to the lender. The entrepreneur will default if the realization of w is "low," i.e., if w < (1 + rk)(i -n)li = D. The lender will monitor the project outcome only if the entrepreneur defaults, in which case it will confiscate all the returns from the project. Note that the contract is completely defined by the pair (i, -), and that it is convenient to consider the optimization problem over these two arguments. Once the optimal (i, -) have been found, one can then back out the implied lending rate of interest, (1 + rk) = -5i/(i -n). In the next section, risk-averse households will be the source of loanable funds to the entrepreneurs. However, in terms of the financial contract, they will be effectively risk neutral because: (1 ) there will be no aggregate uncertainty over the duration of the contract, and (2) they will carry out their lending through a capital mutual fund (CMF). By funding a large number of entrepreneurs, the CMF will take advantage of the law of large numbers to eliminate idiosyncratic entrepreneurial uncertainty and guarantee a sure return to the households. 'In addition, we must assume that a commitment device exists, and that stochastic monitoring is impossible. See, for example, Townsend (1979) The optimal contract is given by the (i, W-) pair that maximizes the entrepreneur's expected return subject to the lender being indifferent between loaning the funds and retaining them.5 More precisely, the optimal contract is given by the solution to max qif( -), subject to qig(W ) 2 (i -n).
An additional constraint guarantees the participation of the entrepreneurs, namely, qifl ) 2 n, which will always be satisfied below. It is also straightforward to show that the entrepreneur will always want to invest all of his net worth in his own project. The first-order conditions to the problem include In. Before proceeding to the general equilibrium model, it is instructive to review some of the comparative statics of the contracting problem. It is straightforward to show that Il(q, n) > 0 and I2(q, n) > 0 (see the Appendix). The positive slope to the capital supply curve (I, > 0) is isomorphic to models that assume some increasing cost to adjusting the capital stock. Here, this positive slope is a natural result of the agency problem. For a given level of net worth, increases in capital production are possible only with a greater reliance on external funds, and these external funds are subject to greater agency costs. As for net worth, it can be viewed as a supplycurve shifter because increases in net worth lower agency costs and thus boost the level of capital production for a given price of capital (IS > 0).
Another variable that will be useful below is the expected return to internal funds. This is given by qf(W5)i/n = qf(W )/[1 -qg(W )]. (Intuitively, net worth of size n is leveraged into a project of size i, entrepreneurs keep share f (z ) of the capital produced, and capital is priced at q consumption goods.) Because we have assumed that all economic rents on the contract flow to the entrepreneur, this return is strictly increasing in q.
II. The General Equilibrium Model
The goal of this section is to embed the contracting problem of Section I into an otherwise standard RBC model. The standard model assumes that new capital is created at the end of the period using consumption goods, with a nonstochastic one-to-one transformation rate ' We are assuming that the economic rents generated by the contract flow to the entrepreneur-an assumption that is quite plausible given that entry into lending is more likely than entry into entrepreneurial activity. Also, since these loans are intraperiod, the opportunity cost of the funds is simply (i -n). 6 The linearity in the optimal contract has obvious modeling conveniences. There are of course limitations, the foremost being the empirical implausibility of the implication that the bankruptcy probability is the same across entrepreneurs (all with differing levels of net worth). Whether this limitation at the micro-level has any aggregative consequences is a topic for future work.
(implying an investment supply curve that is perfectly elastic at unity). This newly produced capital then comes "on line" in the next period. Below, we will utilize this same timing, but replace the one-to-one transformation assumption with the contracting problem outlined in Section I. In particular, if a household wishes to purchase capital, it must fund entrepreneurial projects, and these projects are subject to agency problems. Table 1 summarizes the sequence of events in a given period. We will now turn to the specifics of the model.
The model economy consists of a continuum of agents with unit mass. The agents are of two types: households (fraction 1 -77) and entrepreneurs (fraction 77). As discussed in the previous section, the entrepreneurs are involved in producing the investment good. Entrepreneurs receive their external financing from households via intermediaries that we will refer to as capital mutual funds (CMFs). The economy is also populated with numerous firms producing the single consumption good. We follow BG and assume that these consumption-producing firms are not subject to any agency problems, so that we need not be specific about how they are financed. Because their activities are somewhat standard, we will first discuss the behavior of households and firms. We will then turn to the entrepreneurs and the CMFs.
Households are infinitely lived, with preferences given by Eo f 3'U(ct, 1 -Lt),
where Eo denotes the expectation operator conditional on time-O information, j3 E (0, 1 ) is the personal discount factor, ct is time-t consumption, Lt is time-t labor, and the leisure endowment is normalized to unity. In the course of any given period, households sell their labor input to consumption-producing firms at a wage rate of wt, rent their previously accumulated capital holdings to these firms at rental rate rt, purchase consumption from these firms at a price of unity (i.e., consumption is the numeraire), and purchase new capital goods at a price of qt. Capital goods are purchased at the end of the period with the assistance of CMFs (to which we will return below where Yt denotes aggregate output of the consumption good, 9t denotes the stochastic productivity parameter, Kt denotes the aggregate capital stock (including entrepreneurial capital), Ht denotes the aggregate supply of household labor, and He denotes the aggregate supply of entrepreneurial labor. Competition in the factor market implies that wage and rental rates are equal to their respective marginal products: rt = 9tF, (t), wt = 9tF2(t), and xt = 9tF3(t), where xt is the wage rate for entrepreneurial labor. The assumption of entrepreneurial labor income is necessary because it ensures that each entrepreneur always has a nonzero level of net worth. This is important because the financial contracting problem is not well defined for zero levels of net worth. Below, we will assume that this source of net worth is quite small but nonzero.
We will now turn to entrepreneurial behavior. As noted earlier, a key innovation in the paper is to model entrepreneurs as long-lived. The aggregation result of Section I suggests that this is quite tractable. The contracting problem assumes risk neutrality, so we maintain that assumption here. Agency costs imply that the return to internal funds is greater than the return to external funds. This creates a problem: Absent some additional assumption on behavior, entrepreneurs will postpone consumption and quickly accumulate enough capital so that they are completely selffinanced (i = n) and agency costs disappear. There are several ways to deal with this problem. Essentially, we need to make sure that entrepreneurial consumption occurs to such an extent that self-financing does not arise. Here, we take the most direct route. We will assume that entrepreneurs discount the future more heavily than do households.7 Formally, we will assume that entrepreneurs maximize the intertemporal objective 00 Eo I (/y3)tc, t = 0 where c' denotes time-t consumption and y E (0, 1 ) denotes the additional rate of discounting. To raise internal funds, the entrepreneur rents his capital and inelastically supplies his unit endowment of labor to firms. The entrepreneur then sells his remaining undepreciated capital to a CMF for consumption goods (recall that the capital-creating technology uses consumption goods as the input). After these transactions are finished, the net worth of the entrepreneur (in consumption units) is given by nt = xt + zt[qt(l -6) + rt], where zt denotes the capital holdings of the entrepreneur at the beginning of period t. The entrepreneur uses this net worth as the basis for the loan agreement that he will enter into with the lender. Risk neutrality and the high internal return imply that the entrepreneur will always choose to pour his entire net worth into the loan contract. As noted in the introduction, we sidestep any repeated game aspects of the financial contract by assuming that the contract can be based solely on this net worth level, and not on past contractual outcomes. At the end of the period, those entrepreneurs who are still solvent make their consumption decision, trading off the benefit of current consumption with the future return on internal funds. In the Appendix, we demonstrate that if we hold net worth constant, then equilibrium conditions (3) -(8) are isomorphic to a standard RBC model with costs of adjusting the capital stock.8 It is in this sense that the agency-cost model can be seen as a particular way of endogenizing adjustment costs. One unique characteristic of these adjustment costs is that they are affected by the level of net worthincreases in net worth lower agency costs and thus make it easier to expand the capital stock. The remaining three equations (9) -( 11 ) track the dynamic behavior of this net worth variable.
III. Calibration
The model is parameterized at the nonstochastic steady state to roughly match empirical counterparts. Altman, 1984) .
In our model, bankruptcy can be viewed as the entrepreneur being closed and his assets being liquidated. This suggests that another measure of bankruptcy costs could be obtained by comparing the value of the firm as a going concern with the liquidation value of the firm (absent any other direct or indirect costs of bankruptcy). Using data from Chapter 11 proceedings, Michael J. Alderson and Brian L. Betker (1995) estimate the internal and external value of the firm (where the former is the firm's value as a going concern, and the latter is the value if its assets were liquidated). Using these estimates, they calculate that liquidation costs are equal to approximately 36 percent of firm assets.
For our benchmark results, we set /t = 0.25 (at the low end of the 0.2 to 0.36 range). Below we provide some sensitivity analysis to help assess the importance of this choice.
As for the distribution 4X, we assume that it is lognormal with a mean of unity and a standard deviation of a.
We are thus left with two parameters: af and y. We treat these two variables as unobservable, and instead choose them indirectly to uniquely match two measures of measured default risk: (1) the bankruptcy rate, and (2) the risk premium. The model's bankruptcy rate is given by (t).
As for the risk premium, a loan of one consumption good implies a risky 
A. A Wealth Shock
The first experiment we consider is a onetime shock to the distribution of wealth in the two economies. This shock will be a one-time transfer of capital from households (lenders) to entrepreneurs (borrowers). This experiment is useful for considering the effects of various shocks to the economy that might redistribute wealth from households to entrepreneurs. For example, in Irving Fisher's (1933) debt-deflation story, surprise increases in the price level shift wealth from lenders to borrowers. Another shock might be the standard productivity shock in RBC models. (The next section will consider the effect of such a productivity shock.) Since productivity shocks will also (indirectly) cause a wealth redistribution, it is instructive to examine a pure wealth shock in order to help understand the second, more complicated experiment. Figure 1 presents the economy's response to a one-time redistribution of capital from households to entrepreneurs. The redistribution is 0.1 percent of the steady-state capital stock. This trivial reduction in household capital is actually a relatively large increase ( 13 percent) in entrepreneurial net worth.
In the frictionless RBC model, the source of investment financing is irrelevant, so that the decline in the need for external finance has no effect on the aggregate economy. As for direct wealth effects, they are so small as to be imperceptible (the impulse responses are just flat lines). Hence, we do not report the RBC model.
Matters are much different in the economy with agency costs. Here, increases in entrepreneurial net worth lower the need for external financing and thus reduce the agency costs of investment. This increase in net worth shifts the investment supply curve to the right (as discussed in Section II), thus boosting investment and lowering the equilibrium price of capital. This increased investment entails lower household consumption, which in turn motivates households to increase their labor input, which raises output. In particular, investment increases by 5.5 percent, household consumption declines by 0.8 percent (although aggregate consumption actually rises), household labor increases by 2.2 percent, and output increases by 1.4 percent. After the initial shock, the economy returns to the steady state as entrepreneurs consume their excess capital holdings.
B. A Productivity Shock
The second experiment we consider is a shock to aggregate productivity. To be 1 -qg) ] .12 Along with its direct effect on net worth, this high internal return also increases net worth by leading the risk-neutral entrepreneurs to sharply reduce their consumption (an initial decline of 50 percent). Although the model is highly stylized, this entrepreneurial behavior tends to mimic the behavior of internal funds over the actual business cycle. In particular, the presence of fixed costs implies that during expansions firms see their internal funds rise relative to their fixed obligations, thus freeing up more internal resources for financing."3 Returning to the model, note that net worth peaks (at about 5.8 percent above steady state) in period six, two periods after the shock. At this point, the price of capital has returned to its steady-state level, and the model's dynamics hereafter mirror the RBC dynamics.
The important difference between the agency-cost model and either the adjustmentcost or the standard RBC model is the hump-shaped response function for investment. The hump shape in investment leads to a "reverse hump" in household consumption after its initial increase. The decline in household consumption (after its initial increase) raises household labor supply, which, when coupled with the increase in labor demand (due to the technology shock), results in a hump-shaped response for hours worked. This hump is pronounced enough to lead to a hump shape in output as well.'4
To better understand the model's investment behavior, it is instructive to consider a supply/demand analysis of the end-of-period 12 Recall from Section I that this return is increasing in the price of capital. 13 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these comments.
14 In the earlier working paper version of this paper, the hump in both investment and output was extremely small. The difference is that the earlier version (essentially) assumed that the entrepreneurs consumed a constant fraction of their capital each period (see footnote 7). Hence, entrepreneurial consumption immediately rose in response to a technology shock so that entrepreneurial net worth did not respond as sharply to the shock. There is a similarity between these results and the results of this paper. These labor papers generate positive output growth autocorrelation by introducing a delayed response to a persistent productivity shock. The delay arises because of the assumed inability to quickly '" In the adjustment-cost model, the supply curve remains stationary when adjustment costs are assumed to be a function of investment only. If instead these costs depend on the investment-capital ratio, then the supply curve also shifts out as capital begins to grow. This, however, does not lead to a hump-shaped investment response since households internalize the effect and increase their initial investment in anticipation. With agency costs, investment supply shifts out as net worth grows, but since net worth is exogenous from the household's standpoint, this shift is not internalized. 6 The model's ACF was calculated by averaging this correlation over 500 model simulations. Each simulation was 300 periods in length, and the statistics were calculated only over the last 200 periods. For the standard deviation of the aggregate technology shock we used 0.005. This is somewhat smaller than the standard 0.007, as we wished to avoid bumping into the nonnegativity constraint on entrepreneurial consumption. We have also calculated the "standard" RBC second-moment statistics after HPfiltering the model's data (the data was not filtered for the ACF growth statistics). In comparison to the RBC model, the agency-cost model behaves like a model with adjustment costs-consumption is slightly more variable, while output and investment are somewhat less so. None of these results are particularly surprising, and so, in the interest of space, we do not report these second-moment statistics here (although, as suggested by a referee, this lack of surprise may be of interest in itself).
17 Although for space limitations we do not report it here, the adjustment-cost model does no better in this regard. adjust employment.'8 After this one-or twoperiod delay, the model's dynamics revert to the RBC model. But this short delay is enough to aid in matching the data's ACF for output growth. There is a similar delay in the agency model, caused by the sluggish behavior of entrepreneurial net worth. Because net worth is primarily accumulated capital, it takes some time for this to sufficiently respond to the technology shock. As with the labor models, this delay allows the model to more closely match the data's output dynamics. This discussion also makes clear the importance of persistent shocks in generating the hump shape in all of these models. With i.i.d. shocks, a one-period delay is one period too long so that the peak output response occurs contemporaneously.
Before turning to some sensitivity analysis, we should point out some of the model's failings. The foremost problem is the cyclical behavior of bankruptcy rates and the risk premia. Because of our linearity assumptions, these variables are functions solely of the aggregate price of capital. Hence, the increase in the price of capital that occurs with a positive technology shock also leads to an increase in bankruptcy rates and risk premia. These rates then move back to steady state as the price of capital moves back to the steady state (by about the third period after the shock). From a theoretical perspective this behavior is not surprising: The supply curve for capital is upward sloped because of agency costs, so that a demand-induced movement up this curve must imply an increase in risk premia. This effect could be overcome if entrepreneurial net worth would rise more sharply in the period of the shock. Modeling efforts along this line are worth pursuing in future work.
V. Sensitivity Analysis
A key quantitative conclusion of the model is the shape of the ACF function. In this section we carry out some sensitivity analysis to examine how this result is affected by varying the degree of agency costs in the model. The model's agency costs arise from the unobserved, idiosyncratic shocks faced by entrepreneurs. Hence, two parameters are particularly important: the degree of idiosyncratic uncertainty (a), and the cost of state observability ([u) . We will report sensitivity results on these two parameters.
As 
VI. Conclusion
The principal contribution of this paper is to demonstrate a tractable way of modeling and quantifying the role of agency costs in the business -cycle. One quantitative conclusion warrants restatement: The agency-cost model replicates the empirical fact that output growth 8 There are actually two employment adjustment costs at work here. All three labor models assume that it is infinitely costly to contemporaneously adjust employment. Burnside et al. (1993) assume that this cost drops to zero in subsequent periods. The labor market search models of Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) Another contribution of the paper is to demonstrate the linkages between explicit models of agency costs and adjustment-cost models, which assume that there are increasing costs to producing capital. Holding net worth fixed, this paper's agency-cost model closely resembles an adjustment-cost model in that both deliver an upwardly sloped capital supply curve. The paper thus delivers an endogenous model of capital adjustment costs. As part of this endogeneity, the model also demonstrates how the capital supply curve is shifted by movements in entrepreneurial net worth.
There are several natural extensions of the current work. First, the model is easily amenable to considering other shocks to the econ- 
